Am Oktober 16, Die erste Sitzung der Präsidentenklasse von Lianshang Donglai begann offiziell in Xuchang. CEOs und Generalmanager von 100 Einzelhandelsunternehmen im ganzen Land und in Übersee versammelten sich in Xuchang, um die Geschäftsphilosophie und Managementphilosophie von Pangdonglai zutiefst zu studieren. Angeführt von Donglai Ge, Sie wollen die Wohlwollen im Geschäft fördern und einen besseren Weg verfolgen.
Am Nachmittag des 16., Die Teilnehmer der Präsidentenklasse besuchten Pangdonglais Hauptquartier, Angestellter Haus, Angel City, und der industrielle Logistikpark. Donglai GE leitete das Team und lieferte während des gesamten Besuchs umfassende Erklärungen, Sicherstellen, dass die Teilnehmer gründlich verstehen und lernen konnten. Vor allem, Dies war das erste Mal, dass der Pangdonglai Industrial Logistics Park und seine zentrale Küche, das begann im Juni den Betrieb, waren für öffentliche Touren geöffnet.
Der Pangdonglai Industrial Logistics Park befindet sich im südlichen Abschnitt der Xuzhou Road und an der Kreuzung der Xuyou East Road in Xuchang, einen Bereich von 150 Morgen mit einer Gesamtbaufläche von ungefähr 160,000 Quadratmeter. Mit einer geplanten Gesamtinvestition von ungefähr 1.5 Milliarde Yuan, Es begann offiziell den Betrieb im Oktober 2022.
Das Projekt integriert ein Logistikzentrum, Zentrale Küche, Umfassendes Büro, Produktforschung und -entwicklung, Talentanbau, Unterhaltung und Freizeit für Mitarbeiter, und die Verarbeitung und Verbreitung von Einzelhandelsendprodukten. Ziel ist es, einen intelligenten Park mit internationalen erstklassigen Standards und Qualität zu schaffen. Momentan, Das Logistikzentrum und die zentrale Küche sind in Betrieb, Während das Gebäude des Mitarbeiter Freizeitzentrum noch im Bau ist.
Das Umgebungstemperaturlager des Logistikzentrums ist ein beeindruckender Stahldschungel. Es behandelt die Quittung, Lagerung, Verteilung, und Lieferung der täglichen Notwendigkeiten, Schönheits- und Körperpflegeprodukte, Kleidung, Fußbekleidung, Haushaltsgeräte, und Lebensmittel. Unterstützt durch ein intelligentes Managementsystem und eine spezielle Handhabungsausrüstung, Die Operationen sind ordentlich, schlau, und effizient.
Im kalten Kettenlager, Alle Kühlgeräte stammen aus Top -In- und internationalen Marken, Bereitstellung einer sichereren Speicherumgebung für frische und kalte Kettenprodukte. Das Einfrieren, gekühlt, und trockene Kältelagerbereiche sind auf verschiedene Temperaturen eingestellt, um verschiedene Produkte wie Gemüse zu schützen, Früchte, getrocknete Früchte, und Wein. Vom empfangenden Dock zum Versanddock, Kaltkettenprodukte werden bei einer konstanten Temperatur gehalten, Gewährleistung der zuverlässigen Sicherheit für Kunden.
Der gesamte Boden des Logistikzentrums besteht aus stark dichter Diamantsand, Ereigige Kraft und Stabilität bieten. Zusätzlich, Die auffälligen gelben Konecranes Elastic Kollisionsschutzsäulen können absorbieren 80% von Aufprallkraft, Sorgfältig alle Ecke des Lagerhauses schützen.
Im Juni 2023, Die zentrale Küche des Pangdonglai Industrial Logistics Park begann offiziell den Betrieb. Die zentrale Küche hat einen Gesamtbaumbereich von 34,000 Quadratmeter, in drei Stockwerke unterteilt, Einschließlich einer Rohstoffempfänger -Plattform, Temporärer Speicher des fertigen Produkts, Gefrier- und Kühlungspeicher, Kaltkette Versandplattform, Kochfutterwerkstatt, Tofu Workshop, Brotwerkstatt, Kuchenworkshop, Bratenwerkstatt, Chinesische Gebäckwerkstatt, Kaltfutter -Workshop, Lebensmittelprüfzentrum, R&D Zentrum, und ein umfassender Bürobereich. Es ist mit führenden internationalen und inländischen Geräten und Prozessen ausgestattet, Schaffung einer modernen zentralen Küche, die sich auf die Sicherheit konzentriert, Gesundheit, Qualität, und Professionalität.
Detaillierte Informationen zu den Funktionen und Merkmalen verschiedener Geräte, sowie die detaillierten Prozessflüsse verschiedener Produkte, werden entlang der Korridore jedes Workshops veröffentlicht, alles klar und leicht zu verstehen machen.
Der umfassende Bürobereich umfasst ein Lebensmittelprüfzentrum, Produkt r&D Zentrum, Talent Training Center, Mitarbeiteraktivitätszentrum, Szenario -Anzeigebereich, und DIY Experience -Bereich. Mit erstklassigen Hardwareeinrichtungen, Geräumige und helle Räume, Saubere und ordentliche Umgebungen, Ordentliche Layouts, und Liebe zum Detail, das den Respekt und die Pflege der Mitarbeiter widerspiegelt, Sogar der Parkplatzeingang für den Logistikpark bietet Duschen für Lkw -Fahrer, Verkörperung von Pangdonglais "Great Love" -Kulturphilosophie.
Donglai Ge erklärte, „Wir bemühen uns, den industriellen Logistikpark zu einer hochwertigen Qualität zu machen, High-Tech-, intelligent, und systematisches Modell Einzelhandelsunternehmen und kommerzielle Benchmark für alle, aus denen jeder lernen und sich darauf beziehen kann. Dies wird die Entwicklung der Einzelhandelsbranche und anderer Branchen in eine bessere Richtung fördern, Städte machen, Gesellschaft, und die Welt ein besserer Ort!”
Freedom of Durian, Freedom of Cherries, Freedom of Mangosteen…
Every season, the wish for fruits floods social media. From another perspective, people are becoming more meticulous about fruit consumption.
According to the “China Agricultural Outlook Report (2020-2029),” China is the world’s largest fruit producer and consumer market, accounting for about one-third of the global fruit production. Frost & Sullivan predicts that the market will exceed 1.7 trillion yuan by 2026.
The market is vast, but the fruit business remains challenging. The highly fragmented market, regional and seasonal product differences, and varying consumer habits hinder large-scale expansion of fruit chain enterprises. High transportation and storage difficulties, short selling periods, and challenging cold chain logistics drive up costs. Zusätzlich, the small-scale farming typical of the fruit industry makes standardization difficult, complicating supply chain quality improvements. Experience, kosten, and scale form the “impossible triangle.”
The fresh fruit market has a saying: “Southern Pagoda, Northern Xianfeng, and Western Hongjiu.” As industry leaders listed on the stock market, examining the cold stock prices and profitability bottlenecks of Pagoda and Hongjiu Fruits reveals their pain points.
01
Net Profit Soars, Stock Price Stagnates
High Sales Costs, “Inflated” Skepticism
As of October 17, Pagoda’s closing price was 6.04 HKD, fast 10% aufwärts von 5.56 HKD on September 29 before the holiday, but it remains stagnant compared to the IPO price of 5.6 HKD at the beginning of the year. Does it match the halo of being the “first fruit retail stock”? What is the market waiting for?
The mid-2023 report shows Pagoda’s revenue at 6.294 Milliarde Yuan, hoch 6.4% Jahr für Jahr, with net profit attributable to the parent company increasing by 34.1% Zu 260 Millionen Yuan.
While both revenue and profit increased, the gross profit margin decreased. The gross profit margin and net profit margin were 11.32% Und 3.98%, jeweils, eine Abnahme von 0.3 percentage points and an increase of 0.77 percentage points from the previous year.
Why did the gross profit margin decrease while the net profit margin increased?
A closer look at the financial report shows cost-cutting measures. In der ersten Hälfte von 2023, sales expenses decreased by about 1.7% Zu 242 Millionen Yuan, management expenses decreased by about 6.6% Zu 147 Millionen Yuan, and R&D expenses decreased by 14.1% Zu 74.1 Millionen Yuan.
It is worth noting that the reduction in these expenses was partly due to a decrease in staff in the respective departments. It raises the question of how much of the net profit and net profit margin growth came from internal cost-cutting. How much has core profitability improved?
In terms of overall size, even with a 34.1% increase in net profit far exceeding the revenue growth rate, Die 260 million yuan profit still seems weak compared to the 6.2 billion yuan revenue.
Tatsächlich, during the IPO, the issue of high revenue and low profit was a focus of public opinion. According to data from East Money, aus 2019 Zu 2022, the company’s gross profit margins were 9.76%, 9.12%, 11.24%, Und 11.62%, while net profit margins were 2.77%, 0.52%, 2.19%, Und 2.71%, jeweils.
The contrast lies in the fact that Pagoda is also known for high-end, high-priced fruits. Since opening its first store in 2002, Pagoda has been perceived as “tasty but expensive.” Social media is filled with complaints about the high prices, like “23.5 yuan for an apple” and “90 yuan for a watermelon.”
So why is it not making more money?
The industry’s objective factors mentioned at the beginning of the article exist. According to a research report by Anxin Securities, the gross profit margin ceiling for the fresh e-commerce industry is 30%, with the industry average at around 15%. Under low-profit conditions, many companies struggle to break even.
The prospectus admits that high procurement costs directly impact Pagoda’s profit margins. Aus 2020 Zu 2022, Pagoda’s sales costs accounted for 90.9%, 88.8%, Und 88.4% des Gesamtumsatzes.
Even so, Pagoda’s gross profit margin performance still lags behind industry levels. Why doesn’t it show the scale effect and profitability expected of a leading company?
Pagoda’s business model isn’t selling fruits but franchising. Yuhui Yong, a Jiangxi Agricultural University alumnus, founded Pagoda by pioneering the introduction of the “chain” concept into the low-standardized fruit industry.
Aus 2001 Zu 2008, Pagoda expanded through franchising but suffered continuous losses. Aus 2008 Zu 2015, Pagoda repurchased franchise stores and converted them to self-operated stores. Aus 2018, it adopted a franchise business model again.
As of June 30, 2023, Pagoda had 5,958 offline stores, a net increase of 507 from the same period in 2022. Darunter, 5,945 were franchise stores, Und 13 were self-operated stores, with self-operated stores accounting for only 0.2%.
This franchise ratio is reminiscent of Mixue Ice Cream & Tea. Both rely on franchising for scale expansion but do not profit from franchise fees. Stattdessen, they earn revenue by selling fruits and other products to franchise stores.
In der ersten Hälfte von 2023, Pagoda’s fruit and other food sales revenue was 6.117 Milliarde Yuan, hoch 6.7% Jahr für Jahr, Buchhaltung 97.2% of the group’s total revenue. Revenue from franchise fees, membership income, and other sources accounted for less than 3%.
Jedoch, unlike Mixue Ice Cream & Tea, which sells raw materials to franchisees with ease, Pagoda’s fruit business must overcome various industry characteristics, leading to a high-price but low-profit predicament.
02
Billion-Dollar Dreams and Quality Control Headaches
It is worth mentioning that Pagoda pioneered the “refund policy for unsatisfactory fruits.” In other words, the high product prices include the cost of the company’s selection process.
Jedoch, in practice, Pagoda’s quality experience still needs improvement. Past quality control issues have repeatedly put the company in the spotlight.
Im Juni 2023, a user posted a video on Douyin complaining about being treated differently when using a group purchase coupon at Pagoda. After buying an unsweet watermelon and providing feedback to the store clerk, the response was, “Because you got it cheap, the watermelon is not sweet.”
This incident quickly trended on social media, leading to numerous complaints such as “Pagoda is expensive, paying a lot to be mistreated” and “Asking a few more questions at Pagoda gets no answers, the staff just walks away arrogantly.”
Als Antwort, Pagoda apologized, citing a misunderstanding, and stated they would further strengthen employee management training.
Im Mai 2022, a well-known blogger exposed that Pagoda was making fruit cuts from spoiled fruits, ignoring moldy apples, and continuing to sell them, despite company policies prohibiting the sale of overnight fruits.
Damals, Pagoda was in the sensitive IPO period, and the news quickly sparked public outcry. It was even criticized by the Shanghai Consumer Protection Committee, which stated that brands cannot blindly pursue expansion speed at the expense of franchise store management and supervision.
Pagoda quickly apologized and implemented the following corrective measures: re-inspection of all stores’ operations and quality management, requiring the involved stores to suspend operations for rectification, disciplinary action against regional managers, strengthening SOP training for stores, and increasing supervision, inspection, and mystery shopper visits to ensure fresh fruit quality.
While the attitude and actions are commendable, browsing Black Cat Complaints raises questions about the effectiveness. As of October 17, 2023, Pagoda had 2,300 accumulated complaints. Reviewing recent complaints, there are still issues with “spoiled fruit gift boxes,” “unfresh fruit,” “bad fruit,” and “moldy fruit.”
This raises the question: how much has Pagoda’s quality control improved since going public? How well have high standards been met?
There may be urgency and helplessness. Public information shows that Pagoda’s store count exceeded 2,800 In 2017 und vorbei 5,600 bis zum Ende von 2022, doubling in five years.
Jedoch, this speed still falls short of founder Yuhui Yong’s vision. In 2016, he proposed the goal of “10,000 stores and 40 billion yuan in annual sales by 2020.” By the end of 2020, nur 4,757 stores had been achieved, less than half of the target.
At the earnings release on August 22, 2023, Yuhui Yong reiterated the 10,000-store plan, aiming for 10,000 stores by 2027 Und 30,000 von 2042.
Is this ambition too aggressive? China Food Industry Analyst Zhu Danpeng stated, “Frequent food safety and service issues in franchise stores highlight deficiencies in Pagoda’s management system, corporate culture, and store supervision.”
This hits the mark. Looking at the above performance and user complaints, being large does not mean strong, and fast does not mean excellent. Besides scale effects, there is a need to beware of scale traps. Store expansion requires robust supply chain management, professional team capability, and comprehensive management skills. If the operating radius is exceeded, chaos can arise, posing risks. Especially post-IPO, external expectations for quality control are more stringent. Balancing growth and stability is a pressing question for Pagoda.
Warning signs have already appeared: In der ersten Hälfte von 2022, Pagoda’s single-store product sales revenue for franchise stores was 846,900 Yuan, fallen zu 796,000 yuan in the first half of 2023.
Industry analyst Sun Yewen pointed out that experience, kosten, and scale are the “impossible triangle” in the fruit retail industry. They complement each other, and experience is the foundation of scale. Without a solid foundation, sustainable growth is unattainable. This is the primary challenge Pagoda and Yuhui Yong must overcome before chasing their trillion-dollar dreams.
03
Accounts Receivable Exceed 10 Milliarde, Stock Price Slumps
Reflecting on the fruit market, the contradictions become apparent. Despite the trillion-dollar track, gold mining is not easy.
If C-end retail is tough, what about B-end wholesale and distribution?
Looking at Hongjiu Fruits, its revenue growth rates from 2020 Zu 2022 and the first half of 2023 war 177.78%, 78.12%, 46.70%, Und 19.37%, jeweils.
The slowdown is related to cost pressures. Despite being a fruit distributor with relatively simple operations, Hongjiu Fruits faces high sales costs, similar to Pagoda. In 2021 Und 2022, sales costs accounted for over 80% of revenue.
Am September 5, 2022, Hongjiu Fruits listed on the Hong Kong stock market before Pagoda. Jedoch, the title of “first fruit stock” did not prove lucrative. On the first day of trading, the transaction volume was only 50 million HKD, and the following two months’ trading volume was similarly bleak, leading investors to mock it as a “liquidity assassin.” Fortunately, it later experienced an upward trend, peaking at 41.8 HKD in January 2023, before declining again to a record low closing price of 4.66 HKD on September 14, with a market value of less than 6.7 Milliarde HKD. As of October 17, the stock price was 4.90 HKD, with a market value of less than 7 Milliarde HKD, shrinking by over 80% from the year’s high of 32 HKD.
Am Oktober 11, Hongjiu Fruits responded to media inquiries, Angabe, “There have been no major adverse changes in the company (Hongjiu Fruits).”
According to Chen Song, CEO of Xiangsong Capital, Hongjiu Fruits’ stock price decline is mainly due to the low profitability of the fruit trading business, limited growth potential, and significant operational risks and pressures, leading to low investor expectations and interest in the business model.
This is not an exaggeration. Delving into the fundamentals, some risks cannot be ignored.
Zum Beispiel, accounts receivable exceeding 10 Milliarde. In der ersten Hälfte von 2023, Hongjiu Fruits’ trade and other receivables reached 10.151 Milliarde Yuan, an increase of about 12.84% from the end of last year. The turnover days of accounts receivable increased from 144.8 days at the end of 2022 Zu 188.5 Tage.
Hongjiu Fruits’ financial report explains that the payment cycle of some downstream customers, especially regional terminal wholesalers and small supermarkets, has been extended due to the impact of the pandemic and macroeconomic environment over the past three years.
Ultimately, it is still the tug-of-war between experience, kosten, and scale.
Industry analyst Guo Xing stated that the fresh fruit industry can be broadly divided into upstream growers, midstream distributors, and downstream retailers. Both upstream and downstream are relatively fragmented, while the midstream involves multiple processes such as harvesting, sorting, Verpackung, Erhaltung, Lagerung, Transport, und Verteilung, forming a lengthy and complex value chain in the fresh fruit distribution market.
The wastage is significant. Chen Cunkun, a researcher at the National Agricultural Product Preservation Engineering Technology Research Center, stated that China’s fruit and vegetable wastage rate is still between 25% Und 35%, meaning nearly one-third of the fruits are lost in the post-harvest distribution process.
Admittedly, similar to Pagoda’s downstream chain, Hongjiu Fruits’ standardized processes achieve “end-to-end” supply, integrating the lengthy midstream distribution chain, Verschwendung reduzieren, and expanding profit margins.
Trotz dieses, Hongjiu Fruits’ influence over upstream and downstream remains limited. The high accounts receivable reflect the company’s limited control over downstream product listing, circulation volume, and price changes.
The resulting derivative risks have appeared in the financial report. In der ersten Hälfte von 2023, Hongjiu Fruits’ provision for trade receivables credit impairment losses increased by 48.38% year-on-year to 184 Millionen Yuan. As of June 30, 2023, the company’s cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period were only 557 Millionen Yuan.
04
Revenue Growth Without Profit Growth, High-End Dilemma
In der ersten Hälfte von 2023, Hongjiu Fruits experienced revenue growth without profit growth: revenue increased by 19.37% year-on-year to 8.537 Milliarde Yuan, but net profit decreased by 6.51% Zu 803 Millionen Yuan.
Persistently high costs are partly to blame. In der ersten Hälfte von 2023, sales costs increased by 24.59%, higher than the 19.37% revenue growth, causing the gross profit margin to decline by 3.55 percentage points to 15.37%.
Digging into product business, high-end fruits are Hongjiu Fruits’ winning armor. Half of the revenue comes from six fruits: durian, mangosteen, longan, dragon fruit, cherries, and grapes. Durian alone generated 4 billion yuan in 2022.
As of June 30, 2023, sales of the six core fruits contributed 4.266 Milliarde Yuan, increasing the share from 49.18% Zu 49.97%.
Jedoch, Eintritt 2023, weak consumer willingness to spend has shifted focus to cost-effectiveness and value-for-money. High-priced fruits have faced consumer backlash, with topics like “Earning 10,000 yuan a month but can’t afford imported fruits” trending on social media.
In diesem Zusammenhang, the pressure on Hongjiu’s high-end business is evident. How long can it last?
At critical moments, the actions of the leaders impact both internal and external confidence.
Ab September 11 Zu 13, 2023, Hongjiu Fruits’ controlling shareholders Deng Hongjiu and Jiang Zongying reduced their holdings from 27.1% Zu 26.12%, cashing out about 100 Millionen Yuan.
It’s worth noting that on August 20, Deng Hongjiu and Jiang Zongying had just promised not to reduce their holdings.
Hongjiu Fruits explained that the “reduction” was due to changes in the holdings of two employee incentive platforms they control, not direct sales by the controlling shareholders.
05
Blue Ocean Transformation, Tackling the Impossible Triangle
Embracing the capital market is a crucial path for companies to grow stronger, especially for Pagoda and Hongjiu Fruits, which focus on industrial chain transformation.
Jedoch, capital is not a cure-all, and investors base their decisions on expectations. To tell a compelling value story and secure a good valuation, a solid core capability is essential.
How can they break free from high revenue and low profit? Pagoda is actively seeking solutions.
The semi-annual report shows that the company has established a four-level fruit quality classification system based on taste, rating fruits into four categories (Signature, Grade A, Grade B, and Grade C) to cater to different consumers at varying prices.
In the first half of the year, Pagoda launched four new product brands, including “Sweet Moon” and “Fresh Purple.” As of June 30, 2023, it had introduced 35 proprietary product brands to the market, Buchhaltung 14% of the total store retail sales in the first half of the year.
Looking ahead to the second half of the year, Pagoda plans to continue penetrating lower-tier cities, further expand into existing cities and nationwide, strengthen its B2B business, and expand its export business.
Running the scale story remains the main narrative. Yuhui Yong emphasized that the long-term store expansion plan is based on the population and store density distribution in the cities they have entered: “We are confident in achieving the goal of 30,000 stores in China.”
Turning to Hongjiu Fruits, they are actively seeking change to expand their market radius towards the C-end. Im März 2023, Deng Hongjiu publicly disclosed that they were negotiating cooperation with platforms such as Douyin and Kuaishou to conduct offline brand exposure activities.
The goal is to slowly form a one-stop solution for the live e-commerce fruit supply chain, establishing a strong association between “Hongjiu Fruits” and high-quality fresh fruits.
Im September, Hongjiu Fruits signed a tripartite strategic cooperation memorandum with ID Capital and Frontier Digital Global Trade, opening new fields for digital innovation and cooperation in the Cambodian agricultural supply chain.
Looking at the industry track, overall consumption is recovering, and the future remains promising. According to CBNData, the domestic fresh fruit retail market reached 1.07 trillion yuan in 2021 and is expected to grow to 1.67 trillion yuan by 2026, mit einer zusammengesetzten jährlichen Wachstumsrate von 9.2%. Future demands for quality, personalized, frisch, and nutritious consumption are still on the verge of explosion.
This means that the development dividends for Pagoda and Hongjiu Fruits remain, but the growth threshold is also rising.
How quickly can they conquer the “impossible triangle”? Time is both limited and precious for Yuhui Yong and Deng Hongjiu.
